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RECENT DECISIONS
Enforceability of Arbitration Clause Where. Activity Constitutes
Unfair Labor Practice
hlfteen employees were discharged at the termination of a strike on the
grounds of "strike misconduct." Such action by an employer can be the basis of
an unfair labor practice proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board. 1
The union, however, requested the employer to arbitrate the matter pursuant to
the arbitration clause of its contract with the Company. When the employer
refused to arbitrate, the union commenced the present suit, in a Federal District
Court, under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,2- for specific performance of the
arbitration agreement. As a defense the employer, in addition to claiming that the
arbitration provisions were not broad enough to embrace discharges for strike
misconduct, argued that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction, since there may be
an unfair labor practice involved, and thus the courts are preempted from enforcing
the arbitration agreement. Held: Federal courts may enforce an agreement to
arbitrate in suits under Section 301 even though the matter sought to be arbitrated
3
might constitute an unfair labor practice.
In support of its contention the employer relied on the Garner4 line of cases
which held that state courts and state agencies could not duplicate remedies available under the Taft-Hartley Act. The employer argued that the parties could not
by contract give private arbitrators more jurisdiction than that enjoyed by state
courts and state adminitrative agencies.
In answer the Court pointed out"... the [employer] overlooks the obvious
distinction between contract provisions and matters committed exclusively to the
Board [NLRB]." This reference was to a theory of split jurisdiction evolved in a
number of lower federal court cases. 5 In brief the theory is that when an incident
or an act constitutes both a contract violation and an unfair labor practice the
NLRB has plenary jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice element and the
courts 6 may grant relief for the breach of contract.
1. See, Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of'the Taft-Hartley Act.
2. Labor Management Relations Act §301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §185
(1952).
3. International Association of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, 257 F.2d
467 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied 27 U.S.L. Week 3148, (U.S. Nov. 10, 1958).
4. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Weber v. AnnheuserBusch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
See, Isaacson, Federal vs. State Jurisdiction,42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1956).

5. Independent Petroleum Workers etc. v. Esso Standrad Oil Co., 235 F.2d

364 (3d Cir. 1956); Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, (4th Cir.

1951); Reed v. Faurich Airflex Co., 86 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
6. An action may be brought in either state or federal court but the federal

substantive law of collective bargaining contracts must be applied. McCarrol v.
Los Angeles Council of Carpenters, ---Cal. App. 2d, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).

Cert. denied 26 U.S.L. Week 3220 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1958) (No. 724).
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The division of jurisdiction rests on two sections of the Taft-Hartley Act:
Section 10 (a), securing the NLRB's plenary jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices, states, "this power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise;" section 301 grants jurisdiction to federal district courts over suits for
breach of collective bargaining contracts regardless of the citizenship of the
parties or the amount of money involved. Although the two sections complement
each other it is significant that a breach of contract is not, as such, an unfair labor
practice under Section 8 of the Tart-Hartley Act. 7 Congress felt that the enforcement of the collective bargaining contract should be left to the usual processes of
law and not to the NLRB.8 Thus each sectioh serves a separate and distinct function in the field of labor management relations.
An insight into the historical development of federal labor legislation is
helpful in understanding the relationship between the various sections of the
amended Taft-Hartley Act. The policy of the Wagner Act was to facilitate the
organization of unions and the establishment of collective bargaining relationships. 9 Once the bargaining agent was designated and negotiations were begun
in good faith the government withdrew from the scene. By 1947 unions had
become an integral part of American social and economic life and Congress felt
the changed circumstances called for additional legislation. The resulting TaftHartley Act not only defined unfair labor practices on the part of unions, but also
sought to stabilize the collective bargaining relationship by providing, in Section
301, for suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts.
Of historical importance, also, is the development of the institution of labor
arbitration. Characterized by some as the most important jurisprudential development of the twentieth century, 10 it was virtually unknown at the turn of the
century. During World War II growth was stimulated by the National War
Labor Board's policy to require industries within its control to provide for arbitration in all collective bargaining agreements. Today nearly all"- contracts
provide for a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration. Nevertheless arbitration is not mentioned in the Taft-Hartley Act However, the Supreme Court
has brought this vast quasi-judicial machinery within the control of the courts.
7. See, Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Electric Co., 348 U.S. 437, footnote 2 (1945).

8. See, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 442. "Once parties
have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract
should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor
Relations Board."
9.

See, Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the NLRB,

65 HARv. L. REv. 385, 389 (1950).

10. See, ELKOURI, How ARTITRATION WORKS (1952).
11. A survey of representative contracts made by the Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc. in 1956 revealed that nearly 91 per cent of the contracts contained
such provisions.
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The Lincoln Mills case' 2 ruled that agreements to arbitrate are enforceable in
suits under Section 301. Moreover, the court called for-a "federal"' 8 common law
of collective bargaining contracts to be fashioned by the process of "judicial
inventiveness"'14 from the "policy of our national labor laws."" The Supreme Court
has bean cautious in confirming the several lower Federal and state court decisions16 purporting to develop the content of the "federal common law of the
collective bargaining contracts." The court in the instant case relies heavily on
Lincoln Mills and feels its ruling is within the spirit of that decision.
The theory of preemption developed by the Garner lines of cases 17 is not
applicable to the instant case. The Garner theory of preemption rests on the
principle that a state government may not add to, or subtract from the legal
obligations imposed on labor and management by Congress.s In the instant case
the question is whether the Federal courts are preempted by the Federal Labor
Board. The fallacy of the employer's argument is not uncommonly encountered
and springs from the broad "conflicts of remedies" language' 0 of the Garner case.
Later decisions have clarified the limitations of the Garner preemption doctrine.
The Laburnum case 20 established that the states can award damages based on
past tortious conduct even though some form of relief is available under the TaftHartley Act. Some interpreted the decision as resting on the police power of the
states to prevent breaches of the peace.21 Others suggested that violence was not
24
22
The recent Rgssell 2s and Gonzales
a necessary prerequisite to state action.
decisions proved the analysis of the latter to be correct and ruled that state courts
are not preempted from granting relief based oh a common law tort or contract
theory.25 These cases, in addition to the legislative history, 26 indicate that the TaftHartley Act was not intended to disturb traditional state court remedies except to
12.
13.
14.
15.

Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Id. at 456.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 456.

16. See, Kramer, In the Wake of Lincoln Mills, 9 LAB. L.J. 835 (Nov. 1958).
17. Note 4, supra.
18. See, Cox, Law and the Future: Labor Management Relations, 51 Nw.
U.L. REv. 240, 253 (1957).
19. 346 U.S. at .498. "The conflict lies in remedies, not rights."
when
-...
two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity, a conflict Is
imminent."
20. United Construction Works v. Laburnam Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
21. See, Note, 54 CoLuM. L. REv.11447 (1954). Cf., United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
22. See, Isaacson, Federal vs. State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1956).
23. United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
24. Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
25. See, Note, Common Law Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 468 (1952).
26. See, Conference Report on H.R. 3020,H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 52. ". . . by retaining the language which provides the Board's powers
under section 10 shall not be affected by other means of adjustment, the conference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies exist, one before the
Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the Board shall be in addition
to, and not in lieu of, other remedies."
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the extent that such remedies interfered with rights protected by the Act 2 7 or
regulated conduct Congress intended to be free.28 Thus in some situations an
aggrieved employee, employer, or union might proceed in state court on a common law theory and also file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.
The effect of the present Cameron Iron Works case is to open a third avenue
of relief through the grievance procedure. However, the right to such relief is
established by agreement of the parties, and the scope of such rights is limited
by the language of the collective bargaining contract which establishes the
grievance procedure.29 Unlike commercial arbitration which is a substitute for
litigation, arbitration of a labor dispute may be a substitute for a strike. The
30
arbitration clause is considered to be the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause.
For this reason, among others, the courts have found difficulty in applying traditional contract theories to the collective bargaining agreement. This difficulty
explains, in part, the need for the federal common law of collective bargaining
contracts and the difference between a suit under Section 301 and an ordinary
contract action.
The prime objective of federal labor legislation is to promote industrial
peace, 3' and it contemplates the private settlement of disputes by the parties.
In furtherance of these ends the NLRB will not attempt to administer or interpret
a collective bargaining contrat 32 The Board has recognized the value of arbitration and will adopt an arbitrator's award in an unfair labor practice case if
certain minimal requirements are met, even if an original adjudication would
have reached a different result.33 In a recent case 3 4 of limited application the
27. See, Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Bus Employees v. Wisconsih
Board 340 U.S. 383 (1957); Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
28. See, Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption Under Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 391 (1958).
29. In the instant case the language of the contract was broad and embraced
"any" dispute between the parties. If the arbitrability of a grievance is disputed
the question is for the court unless the contract clearly authorizes the arbitrator
to resolve the issue.
30. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 12 at 455. See, Syme,
Arbitrabilityof Labor Disputes, 5 RUTGERS L. REv. 455, 472 (1951).
31. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §151
(1952), states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate the cause of certain substantial obstructions of
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining . . .
32. NLRB v. Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 NLRB 694 (1943); NLRB v.
McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 NLRB 930 (1954); NLRB v. United Telephone
Company of the West, 112 NLRB 779 (1955).
33. The minimal requirements are: (1) The arbitration proceedings had
been "fair and regular"; (2) all parts had agreed to be bound; and (3) the arbitration decision was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes of the Act." Spielberg
Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
34. Mid-West Metallic Products Inc., 121-NLRB No. 164 (1958).
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Board ruled that it would not entertain an unfair labor practice charge unless the
parties had exhausted remedies available under the contract.
The present case answers another of the many questions raised by §301 and
represents a further recognition of the valuable function of arbitration in labormanagement relations.
John H. Galvin
Delayed Disposition of Remainder Interests to Testator's Heirs Where Life
Tenant is sole Heir
Testatrix in her will provided a life estate for her husband with a power
to invade principal in the case of necessity. The remainder of her estate she
devised as follows: "Upon the death of my husband, I give, devise, and bequeath
such of my property as shall then remain to my distributees under the laws of the
State of New York." The Surrogate in construing the will determined the beneficiaries of the remainder to be the testatrix's distributees at the time of her
death. At that time her husband was her sole distributee under New York law,1
and because of the merger of his life estate and his remainder, he would have
received the whole of her property in fee. In In re Carlin's Will the Appellate
Division reversed the Surrogate and held that the will on its face evidenced an
intention that the husband should receive no more than a life interest in the
property 2 To give effect to that intention the Court held that the beneficiaries of
the remainder should be determined at the husband's death.
The basic canon of will construction is that the intention of the testator
evidenced by the will will be given effect. Where the intention is shown by
dear, unambiguous language in the will there is little difficulty in giving effect to
the intention. However, where the language is less clear, some standards or
rules must be applied in construing the will. Over a long period of time certain
more or less arbitrary canons and rules of construction have developed. These
rules, which are applied only when the will is ambiguous and clear intent is
lacking, reflect both an attempt to give effect to the probable intention of the
average testator and the general policies concerning property with which the
courts have been concerned. One of these rules, which has developed largely
out of the preference for the early vesting of future interests, is that in the
absence of dear and direct intention to the contrary, heirs and distributees under
3
a will will be determined at the death of the testator.
1. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §§47-c, 83-d.
2. 6 A.D.2d 281, 176 N.Y.S.2d 112 (4th Dep't 1958).
3. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §22.60, note 23 at 442 (Casner ed. 1952).

